As I think I said above, unless the morality stems from something that is empirically observable, it can only be subjective and therefore must also be arbitrary...
You've already conceded that something does not have to be empirically verifiable in order to be valid, applicable or the like; e.g., logic.
Your persistence in asking for physical evidence for the existence of morality is rather nonsensical. Why don't you think scientists have been using their microscropes in an attempt to find and define what objective morality is? Well, obviously, scientists don't do that because they realise that any attempt to find morality through such a means is doomed to failure, because morality, like mathematics and logic, is not some physical, material phenomenon. It is something else, in a different field altogether.
I'm certainly not going to defend other moral systems that people have tried to develop. Their flaws and strengths are another discussion. But with regards to so-called 'Objectivism,' I find it remarkable when reading the writings of its proponents just how incredibly un-objective they are.
Whether these achieve their aim of being 'objective' is another matter, but each claims that there is a 'true' moral goal that can be empirically observed and that a 'true' morality can be derived from this.
I don't think you have demonstrated that morality is necessary...
And as I explained something that is intrinsic can still be a delusion - an accidental by-product of evolution that results in certain subjective impulses that have no particular meaning at all.
I think it is a dangerous thing to start claiming that particular moral notions are 'universal'. It's a very difficult thing to prove and, as far as I have seen, there are almost always exceptions to every moral notion you can think of. It also smacks of an imperial assumption that the way you think is the way everyone thinks. An example might be tribal cultures in the Pacific Islands where acts of deception are honoured. Or cultures were surprise attacks on neighbouring tribes are considered good.
Like I said, the existence of flawed moral systems does not, in any way, refute the existence of a genuine objective morality.
I haven't demonstrated the necessity of morality? Did you not even concede that idea yourself when you wrote this:
'
The fact that the nihilist can't actually live like one...'?
It seems that you thereby conceded that it is a fact that a nihilist can't actually live like one, and therefore that morality is necessary, not optional.
But in any case, I don't think I need to argue too much about the necessity of morality. The state of any society that simply did as it pleased would be complete chaos. Hence why a morality is some kind is, in fact, universal to human societies.
As for moral goals. Humans need to survive. Survival requires an orderly and structured society. Therefore, the morality that ensures the most auspicious and orderly society is the best one, in line with moral imperatives.
There's nothing arbitrary about this. It's simply a morality that is founded upon necessity. It's not something haphazardly cooked-up in some abstract way to regulate random and purposeless parts of people's lives. Rather, it's a system that seeks to regulate social behaviour in order to ensure an orderly society, as per the survival necessity.
One may well say that absolutely everything is ultimately illusory and contingent. However, as long as we humans and our contingent existence are, then so too shall those things that accompany our contingent existence exist, e.g., emotion, philosophy, science, morality, etc.
I think it is a dangerous thing to start claiming that particular moral notions are 'universal'. It's a very difficult thing to prove and, as far as I have seen, there are almost always exceptions to every moral notion you can think of. It also smacks of an imperial assumption that the way you think is the way everyone thinks. An example might be tribal cultures in the Pacific Islands where acts of deception are honoured. Or cultures were surprise attacks on neighbouring tribes are considered good.
Dangerous? Dangerous how? What's wrong with dangerous assertions or imperialism from a nihilistic perspective?
Is this your nihlistic consistency showing through? You claim that there is no morality yet you make moral judgements about things like imperialism?
And again, other cultures
do indeed have deviant morals. But once again, it says nothing about whether an objective morality exists or is possible.
In addition, I don't see how you can simultaneously claim the existence of a true moral goal and adherence to 'intrinsic human moral concepts' (which I will take to be your own conscience). These will inevitably be in conflict at some points and you will have to either sacrifice consistency or your own conscience. When you talk about 'universal moral imperative' are you talking about conscience or your particular moral goal?
Yes. The moral goal is the practical 'aim' of morality and the innate moral concepts are the conscience that recognises moral ideas.
I, of course, never said that conscience was infallible. It, like any other kind of intuition, is prone to error. Just like with mathematics, we will, at times, have to step back and debate and think about things before they are clear and understood to us.
Like I stated, the moral imperative is the moral goal, not the subjective recognition of the moral goal, that is, conscience.
As an example, if you were a libertarian you might consider there was nothing immoral about letting your parents languish in an old people's home given that this doesn't actually involve infringing on anyone's rights or freedoms (without a tortuous redefinition of 'rights') but for many caring personally for your elderly parents might be considered an 'intrinsic human moral concept'.
Yes, but this pertains to virtue ethics, which is not what I'm talking about now. To keep it simple, I'd like to stick to deontological ethics for the time being.
So in summary,
1. There are no 'necessary imperatives of morality'. As a result any particular goal cannot be accepted as an axiom for a particular morality. All such goals are subjective and arbitrary.
2. At best there seems to be an intrinsic sense that 'something' is right or wrong but no determination as to whether this is an accident or something meaningful can be made without some kind of evidence.
3. There is no evidence to support the idea that any particular moral notions are universally held and much evidence that most moral notions have an exception somewhere.
4. It is impossible to simultaneously claim adherence to human moral notions (diverse as these are) and a particular moral goal. One must take precedence in which case the other is irrelevant.
1. I think the necessity of morality shows that moral goals are not arbitrary and in fact exist to fulfill a specific requisite end. Hence the practical need for morality. If morality were something that human society could exist without, then I'd be more inclined to believe that there are no goals of morality, but that's not the case.
2. I am maintaining that there is a means to determine right from wrong.
3. The odd exception hardly refutes the existence of a general rule of morality. The fact is that there are human universals that can be found, even within truly immoral societies.
4. Conscience is not irrelevant. It simply, like all human intuitions, some times needs to be developed and sharpened, like any other fallible human faculty.
I'm not sure why this is a difficult question. My original claim was that right and wrong don't exist and that there are only things that you like and don't like. I'm looking for some reason to believe that this isn't true. I.e. something to show me that right and wrong is a characteristic of the real world and not something just imagined by people.
And I think I explained before why it is circular to use the concept of a 'right' in the definition of what moral. You cannot know whether a right exists without first knowing what is right or wrong.
I have read what you have written and I don't think you have shown this necessity at all. You have assumed it within your definition of morality which is indeed begging the question. Pointing this out constitutes my refutation.
'Practical necessity for what'? You might say 'to survive' (or something else) and I would say 'don't I have a choice whether to survive or not, why should I accept your particular behavioural goal?'. And that's pretty much it. The reality of choice (which is why the question of morality arises at all) renders all possible human goals to the realm of preference. Of course, there may be some behaviour that is not chosen - i.e. is reflexive - but as long as you accept some choice exists then it is impossible to say without evidence that any goal is the 'true' one.
I think I've discussed this matter of mere preference enough. I've said and explained why simply saying that it's a matter of like/dislike or arbitrary preference is simplistic and mistaken. If you don't accept my arguments, that's up to you.
Morality is only a classification of human behaviour and not a means to any particular end.
But it is and I have given you the reason. There are hundreds of possible humanly-imagined, arbitrarily selected 'ends' to morality among which 'no-end' is a distinct possibility.
As described above there are no universal moral imperatives and the one you have selected is indeed arbitrary chosen by you. I bring up God only to illustrate the question of evidence to determine whether something is imagined or real.
Morality requires the classification of certain forms of behaviour. It is not the mere purposeless process of doing so. Why would people contrive such a completely pointless system of merely arbitrarily deciding what certain types of behaviour are?
The reason, I believe, that you don't want to accept that morality is a means to an end is because of the necessary consequence of accepting that. That is, if morality has a purpose or purposes, then it is
not something the purpose or basis of which can be arbitrarily decided upon. Its premises must aim towards a particular goal and so therefore, can't be arbitrary.
But of course, you yourself seemed to concede that it is not practically possible for you to live as a nihilist. The other parts of your post alluded to your own moral intuition, which leads me to believe that you're even psychologically incapable of truly being a nihilist.
Unfortunately your comparison works in the wrong way. The scientific method has indeed been subjectively decided upon by a particular group (scientists) who happen to agree with the particular end that the premises are means to achieve. As a result, they regularly reject work by others that do not fit with their premises. Your morality might indeed work in much the same way but it still fail to be 'objective' and 'universal'.
Indeedy.
The scientific method has a specific end: to discern what is actually the case in the physical world. Therefore, certain notions, if applied, will be consistent with this end and others will not. Those that are not consistent with it will not become part of the system of the scientific method. It's much the same for morality.
Of course, this has nothing to do with mere subjective consenting to the consistency of these ideas with the practical end. People agree on these things on a subjective level, but subjective agreement cannot and does not define what premises are consistent with the end goal.
If only one person accepted the premises which were consistent with the scientific method, the opinions of everyone else would not in any way change the fact that only that one persons understanding is the one that is consistent with the end goal of the scientific method. The erroneous understandings would fail to produce the desired end, and the correct one would produce the desired end. Mere subjective opinion and preference is irrelevant.
And you say that this is how my concept of morality works! Well then, now that I've shown you that personal preference is, in fact, not the deciding factor, are you willing to concede the possibility of an objective morality that functions similarly?
And of course. But that is only because your definitions of 'objective' and 'absolute' refer to an actual physical component of the universe. I'm advocating no such thing.
Perhaps a counter example will illustrate.
1. All humans have a sense of morality.
2. It is intrinsic in humans to desire honour. A persons name and reputation outlive him and so maximising this is the necessary goal of a person's life.
3. Behaviour that maximises your reputation is good, behaviour that diminishes it is bad.
4. The opportunity to maximise your reputation is available to all humans and so the resulting morality is universal and objective (non-arbitrary)
5. Behaviour can be consistently ordered towards this goal.
6. Intrinsic moral notions concur with this concept of morality.
Why is this morality and less consistent, effective, universal and objective than yours?
The point was 'logical conflicts' between the ends you identified. My last paragraph was selecting potential conflicts between the ends that you had identified.
It may not be less consistent! It doesn't disprove the objectivity of the morality that I advocate by any means. It seems, however, to pertain more to virtue ethics, and that's not what I'm discussing.
Yes. And you failed to produce an example of a genuine logical inconsistency, as far as I could tell. You only seemed to say that such things were possible. I didn't see any example though.
If a system has various ends then you need a hierarchy of those ends to avoid a contradiction. That hierarchy also needs to meet your criteria of being 'non-arbitrary'.
As an example, if one society endangers the survival of humanity you will need to choose between preserving that society and ensuring the survival of humanity.Because your 'objective' morality is not actually objective (i.e. existing in reality) then it can only be subjective and therefore contingent on your 'feelings' or 'imagination' if you prefer. Therefore it is entirely indistinguishable from a morality derived from the 'prophet' who, I might add, needs only the consistency that all the commands come from him. He will reveal his own hierarchy to resolve 'apparent' contradictions as and when needed.
Yes. As for a hierarchy: any infraction committed against a person should be repaid in like value. Stealing a car is more severe than stealing a six pack as stealing the car constitutes a larger, unjustified confiscation of a person's property.
Or if you're going to say something like 'Well, what if you had to kill one person or kill 1,000?' Aside from the fact that such a situation is a completely fantastic ad hoc, I'll explain what I think about such things.
Killing an innocent person is still wrong, even if it's to save 1,000. And, of course, it's immoral to let 1,000 people die or to kill them when you may save them, due to complicity, or responsibility. Of course, both are immoral. It's a situation in which you are damned both ways, but due to the far-greater severity of taking 1,000 lives, you would be doing less moral harm by only killing one.
Or atheism?
1. Lots of people with different moral standards live in society. Some get punished by the wider group for their behaviour, some don't. There is nothing about 'society' that renders any morality 'necessary'.
2. I've already said that it is quite possible for the nihilist to be rationally correct and behaviourally hypocritical. The fact that you don't happen to like this outcome for yourself does nothing to diminish the possibility that the nihilist is correct.
3. If there is no true 'morality' then there can be no 'being moral'. You order your behaviour according to your own subjectively preferred principles. The hypocrisy would be in claiming and behaving as if something was true when it really isn't.
Human behaviour is contingent on humans and is entirely discoverable. The classification of that behaviour into right and wrong, good and bad, is entirely subjective, conceptually unnecessary, practically unnecessary and fundamentally delusional. Human imagination is capable of lots of things, that is no reason to order your life by any particular fantasy. If you can't find it, don't believe in it.
Cheers,
sparky
What about atheism?
1. I've talked about that to death. I would just like to say however that I regard my morality as not being limited to a crude, atavistic morality that's fossilised like some immensely crude form of the scientific method.
Rather, I see morality as something that's developed gradually and that becomes gradually better and more sophisticated, remaining consistent with the original goals.
2. Of course the nihilist can be correct! Exactly, what I arbitrarily want isn't the deciding factor.
But, why would the nihlist be 'behaviourally hypocritical'? I would wager, because of the practical and psychological necessity of morality. People don't have a choice as to whether they live by morality in a practical sense, and so I don't see morality as something that's optional or based on nothing more than the arbitrary preferences of any given individual.
3. Yup. But I believe that morality is quite consistent with human nature and rationality. I see living by morality as a characterisitic of being a human, and so therefore, I don't see it as being hypocritical to live according to it in the slightest.
And If I haven't convinced you of the error of the thinking in your last paragraph by now (assuming that you're wrong in your views) then I don't think I ever will. And so, I'd now like to discontinue this exchange, as it's long since become repetetive.
You can respond and the like, and I'll read any response. But I'm not gonna write a ton of stuff on this subject explaining every little detail. It's time-consuming and I'm lazy.
But thanks for the civil discussion
Like I said, it made me think a lot about the stuff that I'd been meaning to sort out in my head pertaining to all this.
Topic: right, wrong