But, my friend, I didn't invent the difference.
Let us put it another way. For x to be an emergent property of y, there must be something about y and y alone that is sufficient to explain x. Now take the example of a photon of light with a certain wavelength. Can we really say that if we could not see and somebody told us the wavelengths of a certain colour that we would be able to discern from the quantitative value only, the actual experience of seeing that colour?
You cannot have emergence as brute because then it's just a miracle. Unless you can show completely how an experiential phenomena x can arise sufficiently from the supposed non-experiential phenomena y then emergence cannot work.
And this is where the problem arises because to have a complete description of any experience you have to account for its quality and this is lacking from all emergent models.
What i am saying is that the conclusion that no mechanical model will ever be able to sufficiently account for emergence of experience is unwarranted.
as i told you before, modern neuroscience is in the process of finding out how awareness of 'red' works. its the hardest and most fundamental problem of neuroscience.
the current hypothesis is that humans evolved the language area of the brain and the ability to be aware of 'red' simultaneously. the experience of red is going to be a pretty complicated neural phenomenon when we do figure it out. but we're several decades away from understanding how consciousness arises.
also, think about simple things like anaesthesia induced unconsciouness. how much more evience do you need to see that the causality runs from chemical / electrical phenomenon in the brain to experience and not the other way around.