I've started a new thread for this subject as it was completely off topic in the other thread and merits a thread of its own anyway. Anyhow...
@Winna
No, according to Kant's definition of "existence" you can only apply the predicate with meaning for objects in the sphere of our possible experience - i.e. those for which we can have empirical data.
I guess that itself makes some problems for his definition. For one, it's certainly against the common understanding of the word. Furthermore, there is a distinction between what we cannot verify presently, and that which is unverifiable empirically in the absolute sense. For example, we once had no way at all to verify the existence of subatomic particles, but that lack of ability on our part did not mean that the phenomenon did not exist or could not one day have been verified. At the same time, the existence of 'God' might be said to be something that we will never be able to verify empirically, as many theists assert, but that fact does not preclude the existence of such an entity.
To take another example, we will probably never know what the earliest conditions of the universe were because the laws of physics go fuzzy if you try to look too far back. But that of course does not show that the universe's earliest state and conditions did not exist; that would be absurd.
It seems to me that Kant's definition of existence actually is 'that which can be empirically shown to exist,' but this of course is not what we usually mean at all when we talk of something existing. When something exists, it does so regardless of whether we will ever be able to know that it exists empirically, e.g., something like God or a first cause.
Whatever is outside the possible experience is outside our means to make verifiable statements. Pure constructs of the mind (like the idea of God) are outside our means to make verifiable statements. We can make non-contradictory statements, but they are nothing but that.
So the subjects of particular concepts do not exist according to Kant? It seems to me that they do not exist, according to him, in any form other than that of the purely conceptual.
But just to clarify, does Kant maintain that concepts themselves exist as they are immediately capable of being known and experienced? He doesn't use the term 'empirical' just to refer to physical and material entities, correct? That is, he uses the word 'empirical' to apply to things that can be experienced subjectively, such as concepts, and not solely to external physical entities?
There is something special about the concept of God (as compared to unicorn), though. It's that our reason needs (among others) to see a cause in everything, thus it tends towards posing a cause of a cause of a cause etc, and to see an end of the chain. But the end of the chain is outside our possible experience, thus we get fooled thinking that we can say it "exists" since: we can only have knowledge about what's in the realm of our (potential) experience, and the primal cause, as needed by our reason as it is, is not within it.
The first cause may not be within our capacity to empirically verify definitively, but if it can be shown to be logically necessary then I think it may well be inferred that the first cause, whatever it is, does exist. Again it seems to me that Kant confuses the concept 'can be shown/deduced/inferred to exist' with 'does actually exist as part of the external reality.' Either that, or he's simply engaged in a complete redefinition of 'existence,' and his definition is hardly useful when discussing the 'first cause.'
Addendum:
Well, I think it is a logical necessity that there exists a primal, necessary 'being' or 'state' upon which all else depends for its existence. Other than that, it seems that one must assert that existence itself began, though not within 'time,' of course, and it did so for no reason, without any cause. And of course, I surely don't need to explain the absurdity of an infinite chain of causal events.
Given the necessity of a first cause, then, there must be an immutable principle upon which all else is contingent. But this need not be 'infinite' in a quantitative sense, such as existing for an infinite amount of time. Rather, it may simply be immutable and necessary for the existence of everything else.
Two points which should debunk the above: 1.) Kant showed existence is not a real predicate it is not an attribute but of a condition of having real attributes. 2.) Kant also showed that it is not necessary that every event has a cause. This belief is merely based on habit not on reason the universe does not need a cause. So, there goes your Islamic Kalam Cosmological Argument.
This was the original point of contention. KT's use of Kant's definition of 'existence' does not refute what I contended at all, as the concept of 'existence' that I used is completely different from Kant's.
Topic: Philosophy