Well I wasn't sure whether this should be in this sub forum, but it' interesting! Warning: it's VERY long, but it's sectioned well.
October 2002 Preface
During the 1980's much of the Campaign Against Arms Trade's work focused on sales to Iran and Iraq, countries which had been at war with one another since September 1980. CAAT pressed for a complete arms embargo to be imposed on both states.
The UK was not in the big league as a supplier to either side, but nonetheless did play a vital role in maintaining both military machines. CAAT produced a regularly updated briefing detailing the UK's military connections with the protagonists, or, more correctly, what was known of them from publicly available sources. For a long time, CAAT knew more about links with Iran than with Iraq, although, since the UK was closer to the latter, it was always assumed the ties would be greater.
CAAT's campaign brought some successes, albeit appallingly limited given the bloodbath the Iran-Iraq war was. In 1986, CAAT brought to public attention the attendance at the UK government's British Army Equipment Exhibition of an Iraqi delegation headed by the country's Director of Armaments and Supplies. After an outcry, the invitation to the equivalent naval event the next year was withdrawn. In 1989, just a year after Saddam's forces massacred the Kurds at Halabja using chemical weapons, UK companies were in Baghdad exhibiting their wares at a military exhibition. Protests forced the UK government not to grant the temporary export licences necessary for BAe (now BAE Systems) to show its Harrier and Tornado aircraft, though the Hawk 100 fighter trainer was there. The company had hoped to sell between 50 and 70 of these planes to Iraq. After months of hard campaigning by CAAT, Iraqi exile groups and, as we now know, concerned individuals within the Ministry of Defence, the UK government refused a licence for their export. Almost a year to the day later, Saddam Hussein's forces invaded Kuwait.
The campaign to stop the supply of weaponry to Saddam received only modest press coverage. This was not for want of trying, but the arms trade was not then the newsworthy issue it is today. There was parliamentary support. Early Day Motions (or parliamentary petitions) were tabled condemning the Halabja massacre, the companies' attendance at the Baghdad exhibition and the proposed Hawk sale. Interestingly, some of those most keen to use military force against Iraq now, such as Prime Minister Tony Blair and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, did not sign these EDMs.
"Arming Saddam" was written in late 1990 and early 1991. It looks at the supply of components and technology, as well as complete weapons systems. Today, following the debacle of the Matrix Churchill trial and Lord Justice Scott's subsequent Inquiry, more is known. Scott's "Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions", published on 15th February 1996 and running to five volumes plus an index, tells the full story. Overall it confirms the picture drawn in "Arming Saddam". The Government and companies put exports and profit before the lives of the people of Iraq.
Has anything changed since? Certainly, there is now more publicly available information about arms sales. The UN Register broke new ground when it was set up in 1991. Though far from adequate, it nonetheless started a trend which has seen many countries producing their own reports on arms exports. In the UK, the first of these was in 1997 and they are now annual, each year being more informative than the previous one. However, the reports are retrospective and nothing has been done to allow parliament and the public a chance to comment before export licence decisions are made.
Since 1991 too, a whole category of weaponry has been demonised. By September 2002 some 145 countries had signed the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel landmines; 129 of these have ratified. Small arms, one of the world's weapons of mass destruction, is now receiving similar international attention.
Most importantly, arms exports are now a big political issue with the media and hence the public is aware of them in a way that was simply not the case in the 1980's. Unfortunately, disquiet at the arming of human rights violators and countries in regions of conflict has not translated into action by governments. In 2002, Tony Blair is leading the push to sell BAE Systems Hawk aircraft to India, despite the threat of a nuclear confrontation between that country and Pakistan. Meanwhile his Foreign Secretary has changed the rules to allow the export of BAE Systems Head Up Displays to the United States for incorporation into F-16s bound for Israel. The lives of the people of Palestine count for less than the wish of UK companies to participate in US military programmes.
It seems that, despite the awful lesson of the courtship of Iraq and Saddam Hussein, UK governments are still willing to assist the arms companies without regard for the consequences. Certainly, the Government cannot realistically be swayed by economic arguments. CAAT's compilation of the latest research suggests that there is a net subsidy of £763 million a year. Military goods only account for around 2% of UK visible exports, but the sector is the most heavily subsidised in the UK economy apart from agriculture. Even a recent report provided by the Ministry of Defence at the request of the Defence Committee and authored by two economists from the MoD and two academics concluded that "the balance of argument about defence exports should depend mainly on non-economic considerations".
Nor can the arms trade be justified by the employment some believe it supports. Jobs dependent on military exports represent less than 0.3% of all UK employment. With unemployment at its lowest level in 25 years, many localities with plants making military equipment for export are now experiencing labour shortages. In these circumstances, most of those working in the arms industry are likely to be able to find alternative employment fairly speedily. Those who do not, could benefit from supportive policy initiatives that would cost far less than the support given to military industry at present.
So what is the attraction of the arms trade for Governments? Why, whatever they might say in opposition, do governments still support an industry that is increasingly questioned by the electorate? In the 21st century, are governments still seduced by an image which equates authority and influence with military might? This obsession with arms needs to be shed if the UK is to avoid arming other dictators and supplying them with the wherewithal to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.
This briefing investigates the supply of British military equipment to Iraq in the years since Saddam Hussein became President of that country. It starts by looking at the UK government's policy on arms sales to Iraq; describes general UK-Iraq trade relations; and gives details of the sales of complete British weapons systems and military equipment to Iraq. The following section describes how Iraq sought to build its own military industry using components and technology from overseas and looks at Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons' programmes. In all cases the emphasis is placed on the British involvement in these programmes. The training of Iraqi military personnel in the UK is then discussed. Finally, the briefing questions whether British equipment might have reached Iraq via Jordan or Chile.
History
Baghdad, Basra and Mosul, the three provinces of the Ottoman Empire that form modern Iraq, were taken over and occupied by British troops during World War 1. In 1920 Britain was granted a League of Nations' mandate over the territory and installed a monarchy based on a ruling class of large landowners. Iraq became a nominally Independent state in 1932, but British control over its oil had been secured and the Royal Air Force was guaranteed bases there. The monarchy was overthrown in a 1958 coup which marked Iraq's true independence, but led to an intense struggle between the Communists, Pan-Arab Nationalists and Ba'athists, an Arab nationalist and socialist group. The latter emerged victorious in February 1963 following another coup only to lose power in November of the same year. After a series of unstable governments, the Ba'athists regained control in July 1968.
The Ba'ath Party moved quickly to eliminate any political dissent and laws promulgated by its Revolutionary Command Council, whose Deputy Chairman was Saddam Hussein, led to a one-party state and a rule of terror. Extra-judicial killings, torture, "disappearances" and imprisonment have continued ever since and have been well-documented by human rights organisations.
Around a quarter of Iraq's 18 million population are Kurds and they have been subject to particularly brutal repression, not only by recent Iraqi governments but also under the earlier British rule. In the early 1970s Iraq's Kurds were involved in an armed struggle with Baghdad and were receiving support from Iran. In March 1975 Saddam Hussein, by now Iraq's Vice-President, signed the Treaty of Algiers with the Shah of Iran. Under this Treaty, the northern Iran-Iraq frontier was closed, preventing supplies reaching the Kurds from across the border.
In return, Iraq allowed Iran access to the Shatt al' Arab waterway, the disputed boundary between the two countries. In July 1979, his predecessor having resigned for "health reasons", Saddam Hussein took over as President. To remove any possible remaining opposition to himself, Saddam immediately had twenty-one senior Ba'ath Party officials and members of the Revolutionary Command Council executed. On 17th September 1980, just over a year after becoming President, Saddam abrogated the Treaty of Algiers that he himself had helped to draw up. Five days later his armies crossed the border into Iran. Eight years of armed conflict had begun. After one million people had died in this war ("World Military and Social Expenditures" 1989), a United Nations-sponsored ceasefire came into effect on 20th August 1988. Saddam's war against Iraq's Kurdish population, which in 1988 had included the use of poison gas, continued.
The cost of the war with Iran had left Iraq heavily in debt. In July 1990 Iraq accused neighbouring Kuwait of breaking international agreements by producing too much oil, thus lowering the world price and Iraq's income. On 2nd August 1990, after Kuwait had in fact agreed to cut its oil production, Saddam's forces once again invaded a neighbouring state. The President was later to claim that, as part of the old Ottoman province of Basra, Kuwait was an artificial creation and was truly a part of historic Iraq. On 6th August the United Nations Security Council instituted an arms embargo against Iraq as part of a series of sanctions imposed as a result of the invasion.
Military Expenditure [top]
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook 1990, 6.9% of Iraq's gross domestic product was accounted for by military expenditure in 1979. By 1984 this had risen to 29.1%, failing only slightly to 27.5% in 1985, the last year for which SIPRI has the percentages. This compares with about 5% for the UK in this period; only Angola comes anywhere near the Iraqi figure with a few other Middle Eastern countries over 20%. In monetary terms, the 1984 figure is equal to US$31,590 million at 1988 constant prices and the 1985 figure equals US$23,506 million. Thereafter the spending declines.
Arms Supplies [top]
Part of this military expenditure was used to purchase arms from overseas. During the first half of the 1980s, Iraq was the world's biggest importer of major weapons systems and it remained second, behind India, in 1986 and 1987. A report by SIPRI in 1987 identified twenty-six countries which had supplied arms both to Iraq and to Iran. These countries were: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, France, West Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, North Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In addition, twelve countries had supplied only Iran while four countries had sold only to Iraq - Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan and the Philippines. Not all of these deals were done with the knowledge or support of the government of the country concerned.
Soviet Union and France
The long list above however conceals the fact that just two countries supplied most of Saddam's arsenal. According to the SIPRI Yearbook in 1989, equipment from the Soviet Union accounted for 47% and France 28% of Iraq's major weapons systems during the Iran-Iraq War. The Soviet supplies included tanks, artillery systems, helicopters and missiles, as well as advanced MiG aircraft. (Jane's Defence Weekly, 18.8.90) Mirage and Super Etendard aircraft and Exocet missiles as well as helicopters and missiles were sold by French companies.
In November 1980, however, the Soviet Union had stopped its arms supplies and these were not resumed until after the Israeli air-raid on Iraq's nuclear reactor at Osirak in July 1981. (Financial Times, 11.11.80 and 6.7.81) The Soviet embargo, although short, made Iraq look elsewhere for its weapons. It served also to boost Saddam's ambitions to build his own arms industry and thus lessen his dependence on outside military supplies. France had its own problem with Iraq - extracting payment for the weapons became difficult towards the end of the 1980s. Ironically, this problem was to have been solved on the day of the invasion of Kuwait when the French government was due to sign a credit deal with Iraq to cover the latter's £2.16 billion debts to French arms companies. (Times, 4.8.90)
Compared with the Soviet Union and France, the UK's role in arming Iraq may seem small. It was not however insignificant and it illustrates dramatically both the changing nature of the arms trade and the difficulties inherent in trying to control it.
UK Government Policy [top]
The UK government's policy on military exports to Iraq and Iran was not formally spelt out in detail until 1985. Prior to that, a letter from the Ministry of Defence dated 17th May 1982 says: "Our policy is one of neutrality in the conflict between Iran and Iraq ... We are prepared to consider requests for the supply of defence equipment from either side on a case by case basis, taking into account our neutrality obligations, our relations with the countries concerned and the need to work for a peaceful solution to the conflict."
It was on 29th October 1985, in a written reply to a House of Commons question, that the then Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe announced the policy that remained in effect until the invasion of Kuwait:
"The United Kingdom has been strictly impartial in the conflict between Iran and Iraq and has refused to allow the supply of lethal defence equipment to either side.
In order to reinforce our policy of doing everything possible to see this tragic conflict brought to the earliest possible end, we decided in December 1984 to apply thereafter, the following guidelines to all deliveries of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq:
(i) We should maintain our consistent refusal to supply lethal equipment to either side;
(ii) Subject to that overriding consideration, we should attempt to fulfil existing contracts and obligations;
(iii) We should not, in future, approve orders for any defence equipment which, in our view, would significantly enhance the capability of either side to prolong or exacerbate the conflict;
(iv) In line with this policy, we should continue to scrutinise rigorously all applications for export licences for the supply of defence equipment to Iran and Iraq."
One of the problems with this stance was the concept of "lethal" as distinct from "non-lethal" equipment. It can be argued that all equipment used by the armed forces contributes to their actual or potential lethality. This was admitted by Colin Chandler, then head of the Ministry of Defence's Defence Export Services Organisation. Speaking at the 1986 British Army Equipment Exhibition Mr Chandler (now Sir Colin) said "there is no such thing as a'non-lethal' weapon."
Five months after the ceasefire in the war with Iran, the "guidelines" were "being kept under constant review in the light of the ceasefire and developments in the peace negotiations." (Hansard, 18.1.89) Over a year later however the "guidelines" were still British government policy. Foreign Office Minister William Waldegrave said:
"Exports of defence-related material to both Iran and Iraq are governed by the guidelines announced by the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the House on 29 October 1985. These are applied on a case-by-case basis in the light of prevailing circumstances, including the ceasefire and developments in the peace negotiations. Under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty we control the export of sensitive nuclear-related material and technology. As a member of the missile technology control regime, we control exports of missile-related material and technology. Our export controls are implemented under the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1989. All export licence applications are given the most careful scrutiny." (Hansard, 23.4.90)
Licences for the export of military equipment are issued by the Department of Trade and Industry after consultation with the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. Alan Clark, Minister of State for Defence, revealed that: "A group of military and civilian experts meets as required to assess the military significance of export licence applications for Iran and Iraq." (Hansard, 26.4.90)
This, then, was the official stated UK policy on military exports to Iraq until the August 1990 UN embargo. The real interest however lies in seeing how this policy was interpreted. The British government does not publish a list of the licences issued for the export of military equipment nor will it answer questions in parliament about specific deals as it claims such information is commercially confidential. The Government has even refused to provide details of the annual value of arms sales to Iraq despite having given similar figures in respect of Malaysia. (Hansard, 18.1 0.90) The information contained in this briefing as to how the Government has acted with regard to military sales to Iraq has therefore had to be gleaned from reports in newspapers and military magazines and from parliamentary statements and is of necessity incomplete.
Trade Promotion
The trade in military equipment does not operate in isolation from other trade. Background information on the UK's general commercial relationship with Iraq during the late 1970s and 1980s is essential for an understanding of the military-related trade which took place in this period.
Just days before Vice-President Saddam Hussein assumed the Presidency of his country in July 1979 he received British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in Baghdad and agreed to lift Iraq's selective trade embargo against the UK. This embargo had been imposed in July 1978 after Britain had expelled eleven Iraqi diplomats following the murder in London of a former Iraqi Prime Minister. The lifting of the embargo heralded a "new page" in Anglo-lraqi relations, Lord Carrington said, and the UK would look favourably on an Iraqi request for an economic agreement to boost trade. Restoring trade with Iraq was seen as particularly important in view of the loss of Iranian markets after the fall of the Shah. One deal with Iraq that was said to be outstanding from before the embargo was for "hundreds of millions of pounds" of Plessey's military electronics. (Financial Times, 5.7.79)
Visits to Iraq by Cecil Parkinson, then a Trade Minister, in October 1979 and by Secretary of State for Trade John Nott in November of the same year followed. Then in February 1980 the Committee for Middle East Trade, an advisory group to the British Overseas Trade Board (part of the Department of Trade and Industry, spent five days in the country. This was seen by the Financial Times (15.2.80) as "part of a campaign to expand trade with the second largest oil producer in the Middle East". There were hopes that two military contracts might soon be signed though the report does not indicate what these were.
In July 1981, eleven months into the war with Iran, Douglas Hurd, then a Minister of State at the Foreign Office, visited Baghdad to celebrate the anniversary of the 1968 revolution, which brought the Ba'athists to power. The Guardian (17.7.81) talked of Mr Hurd acting as a "high level salesman" and pointed out that Iraq's requirement for a comprehensive air defence system, for which British Aerospace was a contender, was a "tantalising prospect". In the same month, and after a year of negotiation, Iraq and the UK signed an economic and technical co-operation agreement. The new warmth between Baghdad and London would assist exporters and the new Trade Secretary, John Biffen, was to make an official visit to Iraq in October 1981. (Financial Times, 25.7.81) At the meeting in Baghdad from 3rd to 7th October 1981 the UK-Iraq Joint Commission was set up. It was to meet annually to discuss trading relations between the two countries. (DTI Information Service)
By 1983 however there were problems. Iraq's oil revenues had fallen while its war spending was increasing. In August of that year the Confederation of British Industry advised companies not already doing business in Iraq not to enter the market because of that country's deteriorating financial situation. (Financial Times, 11.8.83) Help was soon at hand, however. The then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced that the Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) was extending a £250 million loan to Iraq. Additionally, cash contracts worth $200 million that had already been signed would be converted into credit. In exchange £30 million owed by Iraq to British companies would be paid without delay. (Financial Times, 7.10.83; Times, 7.10.83) Although backed by the British taxpayer through the ECGD, the loan was actually handled by merchant bankers Morgan Grenfell. The protocol the bank signed with Iraq stated that the loan could not be used for military equipment to help Iraq in its war against Iran. (Financial Times, 16.4.84) However it is possible that this loan, and those that were to follow during the mid-1980s, could have released for the war effort funds that might otherwise have been needed for civilian projects.
Reports on the Ministerial meetings mentioned above that took place during the Iran-Iraq War show that military projects were often discussed. The reports said that the projects could not be started until hostilities ended.
http://web.archive.org/web/20060622205618/http://www.caat.org.uk/publications/countries/iraq-1991-briefing.php
Topic: Arming Saddam: The Supply of British Military Equipment to Iraq, 1979-90