I also don't find this compelling either. If there was nothing
This isn't the same as a something coming from nothing argument. I am not very sympathetic toward the "something from nothing" argument since the concept of "something" only makes sense within a spatio-temporal framework whilst absolute nothing is a weird sort of null set. Even if someone doesn't want to grant the above argument, until they demonstrate that creation ex nihilo is possible under standard assumptions about God's omnipotence, they are begging the metaphysical question.
Apologists are very quick to talk about logical possibilities, I'd like to argue that the notion of something coming from absolute nothing is a logical impossibility. Similar to a square circle... it is not coherent, I can't even envisage it.
Formally, (2) takes a Bayesian form. I'll spare you the technical details because inductive arguments of this sort presuppose an understanding of probability calculus. If you're interested, check this:
http://fitelson.org/confirmation/skyrms_6.pdfIf we remain faithful to the Bayesian cause, It is antecedently more likely on theism that "we exist". This is because theism entails our existence whilst ontological naturalism doesn't. In other words, us existing is a logical necessity under theism.
If we want to formulate the above argument in probabilistic terms, it would be the along the lines of (I've simplified it by missing out a few qualifications):
Where "E" denotes existence and "H1,H2" denote the rival hypotheses, theism and naturalism.
P(E | H1) = 1
P(E I H2) ≠ 1 [or P(E I H2) < 1]
∴ P(E | H1) > P(E I H2)
See
http://www.councilofexmuslims.com/index.php?topic=27192.0 for a relevant thread.
Nonetheless, this argument would not make me accept theism but I still think that it's kind of cool. I don't find
(2) to be an ultimate argument since it is prima facie rather than ultima facie.
To turn it into an ultima facie argument, you need to conclude that:
P(H1 I E) > 1/2
I don't even know how one could defend the above.
I need to look into the argument for God as a properly basic belief more
Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism by Maitzen is my favourite challenge to God being a basic belief, i.e. sensus divinitatis/fitrah.
http://philosophy.acadiau.ca/tl_files/sites/philosophy/resources/documents/Maitzen_Hiddenness.pdfAbstract: According to the much-discussed argument from divine hiddenness, God’s existence is disconfirmed by the fact that not everyone believes in God. The argument has provoked an impressive range of theistic replies, but none has overcome – or, I suggest, could overcome – the challenge posed by the uneven distribution of theistic belief around the world, a phenomenon for which naturalistic explanations seem more promising. The ‘demographics of theism’ confound any explanation of why non-belief is always blameworthy or of why God allows blameless non-belief. They also cast doubt on the existence of a sensus divinitatis: the awareness of God that Reformed epistemologists claim is innate in all normal human beings. Finally, the demographics make the argument from divine hiddenness in some ways a better atheological argument than the more familiar argument from evil.
Topic: Introductory thread V2