Antoine Borrut reviews Denis Genequand and Christian Julien Robin (eds.), Les Jafnides: des rois arabes au service de Byzance (vie siècle de l’ère chrétienne)
http://islamichistorycommons.org/mem/wp-content/uploads/sites/55/2016/11/UW-24-Borrut.pdfThe volume under review revisits the Ghassānids, the famous Arab dynasty allied to Byzantium that has attracted considerable scholarly attention over a good century or more. This undertaking begins with a challenge to the very name granted to the dynasty: “Ghassānid” is indeed quite a misnomer. Names ending in –ids (-idès in Greek) imply a common ancestor and so one should more accurately refer to them as Jafnids, that is the descendants of one Jafna (80 and n. 2, 193). (The same applies to the Lakhmids who are more aptly named Naṣrids after their eponym Naṣr.)
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It is, therefore, not surprising that Armand-Pierre Caussin de Perceval and Theodor Nöldeke could be regarded as founding fathers of what might rightly be called the field of “Jafnid studies” already in the nineteenth century. The field, as it were, generated a sustained body of scholarship arguably best exemplified by the extensive work of Irfan Shahîd. The latter’s arguments, in fact, are discussed throughout this volume. Several of the contributors to the present book see Shahîd’s work as inextricably linked to Arab nationalism and, thus, revisit his conclusions on the Jafnids and what they can tell us of Arab practices of power on the eve of Islam.
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The final paper is by Michael Lecker (“Were the Ghassānids and the Byzantines behind Muḥammad’s hijra?”, 277-93). It explores an intriguing hypothesis that links Heraclius’ campaign (April 622), the ʿAqaba meeting between Muḥammad and the Anṣār (composed of Khazraj and Aws, June 622), and the subsequent hijra (September 622) (277). To demonstrate these connections, Lecker considers the long-term interest of the Khazraj in the “water resources of the Jews in Upper Medina,” which they attempted but failed to capture around 617 at the battle of Buʿāth (278). Lecker assumes that the Khazraj had a “dominant role” in the ʿAqaba meeting (279) precisely because they were seeking support for the effort to seize those same lands. Lecker then turns to the links between the Khazraj and Ghassānids; he concludes that “the communication channels between the Khazraj and Ghassān were open, and hence the assumption that the latter played a role in the ʿAqaba meeting is not far-fetched” (287).
The Ghassān are also attested in the umma agreement (i.e., the so-called Constitution of Medina, ca. 623 CE): after listing Khazraj (§28-32) and Aws (§33), the list continues with the Banū Thaʿlaba (§ 34), the Jafna (§ 35), and the Banū al-Shuṭayba (§ 36). The three last groups were Ghassānids (or their clients). Lecker thus concludes that “the participation of three Ghassānid groups in the umma agreement suggests that, shortly after his arrival at Medina, Muḥammad was backed by the Ghassānids alongside their Byzantine overlords” (289). The argument, however fascinating, largely ignores the demise of the Ghassānids several decades earlier. It also undermines Jafnid agency at a time when their loyalty to Byzantium was far from obvious.
Lecker situates his hypothesis in a broader context, namely the Byzantine effort to replace the Jews of Medina, “longtime allies of the Sassanians, with a political entity friendly to Byzantium” (289). And thus the long-term goal of the Khazraj to seize Yathrīb/Medina was achieved by Muḥammad (290). Lecker is perfectly right to note “that Heraclius’ fortune in his war against the Sasanians since 622 coincided with those of Muḥammad in his takeover of Medina and large parts of Arabia” (p. 290, n. 66). Again, the hypothesis is compelling. It will need much more research, however, to be fully convincing.
See the previous discussion here on Lecker's arguments:
http://www.councilofexmuslims.com/index.php?topic=27568.msg862005#msg862005