Then, I would assume he could use it as an inductive argument for God
This is how one could be structured,
Evidence to be explained: "God is not a conception of reality derived from the natural world. "
1. Pr(E) ≈ 1
2. Pr(N|B) is intrinsically not much more probable than Pr(T|B)
3. Pr(E|T) > Pr(E|N)
4. Other evidence held equal, N is probably false as Pr(T| B&E) > Pr(N|B&E)
Analysis of this formulationP1. If we replace "God" with "X" as per the deductive argument, Pr(E) ≈ 1 is not true only for "God".
P2. Does intrinsic probability actually exist?
http://wmbriggs.com/blog/?p=12617P3. This is trivially true, it borders on tautology. Of course God is false under naturalism and true under theism, what does this actually show apart from a basic understanding of definitions?
P4. Key phrase here is "other evidence held equal". This inductive argument is prima and not ultima facie. That means that it could still be the case that the cumulative case for naturalism > cumulative case for theism. So even if this inductive argument was successful, I could simply say that it is the man of the match in a team full of weak footballers.