Been some time since I've been here. Unfortunately your dear Dr Sloth doesn't wish to convey my views here in copy and paste and has requested that I come personally to entertain your objections -- despite the fact that he's been talking quite a lot behind my back and posting unnecessary garbage for some time about me. I suppose his barking has worn his throat out.
As such, I'll deal with the rebuttals and queries in order:
"Kevin" is here, since I realize people choosing identities foreign to their concept of civlization hurts their fragile sensitivities -- I'll keep my colonized name here for your convenience.
I also find it interesting how most of the discussion is on my YT history -- ad hominems galore. Quite typical for atheists to attempt to poison the well before actually addressing the subject.
So, let us start with the actual substance, shall we? Starting on page 2 of the post, CaptainDisguise attempts to tackle the argument, being the first person to actually understand most of it. First he says:
"IF naturalism is true, then all meaningful concepts (that are formed in our head) are either some natural experience or a composite of natural experiences. For example, we can think of a unicorn because it is a horse with a horn etc. On the other hand, non-meaningful concepts are incoherent composites (eg: a married bachelor or a square circle)"The first premise is actually attacking scientism and it would be better understood if he had not skipped the lecture to get to the end, because I explain the origin of the first premise based on George Smith's understanding of knowledge and explanation:
"Because the supernatural is totally lacking in explanatory power, the naturalistic position is impregnable, and insufficient appreciation of this point sometimes results in undeserved charity toward the theistic position. For example, in his brilliant God and Philosophy, Antony Flew bases his atheism on what he calls “The Stratonician Presumption” (after Strato of Lampasas’s, circa 269 B.C.): this is “the presumption that the universe is everything there is; and hence that everything which can be explained must be explained by reference to what is in and of the universe.” In other words, as Flew explains in An Introduction to Western Philosophy, “all the phenomena of the universe can and must be explained without reference to any principle or principles in any sense ‘outside’, or ‘beyond.’….[However], Flew writes of his Stratonician Presumption that it is “defeasible of course by adverse argument.”… But Flew is wrong, or at least misleading, when he grants to theism the theoretical possibility of gaining a foothold by dislodging naturalism through argumentation. There is no such possibility, even in principle." --"George Smith (The Case Against God).
Smith goes on to say:
" The theist digs his own hole from which there is no escape. He creates a problem by demanding an explanation for the natural universe, but now, having destroyed the context in which explanation is possible, he denies to himself the possibility of ever solving the problem…The structure of each argument entails an inference from the natural to the supernatural –which, in terms of human knowledge, means an inference from the knowable to the unknowable….the concept of god actually negates the possibility of explanation." (Case Against God)
So that's the context behind the first premise. The first premise ( If meaning (and explanation) can only be derived from the natural world, then all conceptions of reality are derived from the natural world.) essentially says that there is a position (scientism) that asserts that meaning and explanation can only be made within the context of the natural world (and yes, our minds are part of that too), and as such, concepts of reality (say, existing things) can also only be made within the context of the natural world -- whether individually or as composites (though I use composites as my primary example in explaining the premises later). These things must be comprehended (meaningful) -- although not fully -- and must be coherent (the opposite of incoherent, since one cannot understand something as a contradiction or without a proper medium of language [gibberish for instance, would not be coherent]).
Captain goes on to say:
"However, some people believe in God which is beyond all the composites of natural experiences. God is not a composite of natural experiences nor a non-meaningful concept. Therefore, naturalism is false."More than "some" believe in a God, gods, or supernatural entity in general. Not only does this show that scientism (and subsequently, naturalism) as being false, but it proves that meaning and explanation come from beyond the barriers of the natural world -- thereby rationalizing theism above atheism (but not necessarily proving God's existence).
Captain goes on to say:
"I guess I could take issues with premises 3 and 5.
Regarding premise 3, since the argument is specifically about meaningful conceptions as perceived by humans; I could reject premise 3 and argue that, as far as we perceive it, God is also a composite of natural experiences."'As perceived by humans' -- as though there would be any other meaning here? How trivial to even make such a comment. And you and they wonder why I have a hard time believing you're not purposefully making things difficult?
"To give an analogy. "A very fast person" is a meaningful concept in my head. So is the concept of an even "faster person" and then the "fastest person". Most of us might have a natural experience of what it means to be a fast or the fastest person. However, we can imagine a person being faster than the fastest person in real life (such as the superhero Flash). I can think about the same person moving faster than the speed of light. No one has any natural experience of anything moving at the speed of light, let alone faster than the speed of light. Yet I am able to form a meaningful non-contradictory concept of a person moving faster than light. I could take the next step and also form the concept of an "infinitely fast person", which again, no one has any natural experience of."
However, you can notice that the concept of an "infinitely fast person" is just an extrapolation from the concept of "a very fast person". So rather than the concept of an "infinitely fast being" being beyond our natural experiences, it is, at best, an "amplification" of our natural experiences."False -- extrapolation and amplification can only occur within their set contexts. You can keep going "faster, and faster, and faster, and faster", but to think that there is the possibility of something "Beyond fast" makes no sense if that which can be comprehended is only within the scope of the natural world.
Meaning: metaphysics shouldnt even be a subject -- it shouldnt even be POSSIBLE to entertain the idea of something beyond the scope in which we exist.
He goes on:
"Likewise, I could argue that the Judeo-Christian-Islamic conception is only an amplification of our natural experiences of what it means to be merciful, benevolent, powerful, a creator etc. Thus I can reject Premise 3."But they aren't. The ideas of "mercy", "power", etc. are understood in full by us, but the concept of "beyond mercy", "Beyond power", are not. The fact that they are believed and that the possibility is entertained is evidence that the natural world is not all there is if premise 1 is accepted.
When we say Allah is "Beyond Merciful", we can only understand to the extent of our relative experiences, but we also understand the concept of "beyond" -- which is neither amplification or extrapolation -- but is outside the paradigm of our existence.
IF the paradigm in question is all there is, then it should not direct us to that possibility.
Once again, I focus on the "Possibility" and the "belief" itself -- not the actual content of said belief beyond this (pun intended).
Captain goes on to say:
"Regarding Premise 5, this objection is related to my previous point but from a different angle. However, I do want to put out the disclaimer that I don't think I understood what he meant by premise 5 and am curious to the way it is worded.
Nevertheless, I could argue that a conception of something that is said to be "beyond" natural experience is also a natural experience. This is a bit tricky to get across.
With all the natural experiences we have, we are able to think of the concepts of "nothing" and "infinity". I am able to consider the possibility of everything not existing. I am also able to consider something being infinite (infinitely large or fast as in the previous example). While these maybe described as "beyond" the natural world; this is, essentially just a construct in our language and in fact they are concepts derived from the natural world.
So really, I am just saying this whole argument is the byproduct of misunderstanding language. Early Wittgenstein would not be pleased."Coincedentally, the Logical Positivsts made the same arguments against metaphysics in general, without realizing they were making metaphysical arguments in the process. "A confusion of language" was often the excuse. From my thesis:
"A major objection can be raised here, especially in regards to premise (5). The atheist may claim that to believe that there is something “beyond the natural world that shares no properties with the natural world” is a meaningless inference because it is a confusion of language. To say something is “beyond” just implies that something is ‘external to’ the object in question, and to say that something “shares no properties” with that object, means to have properties other-than. In the context of the statement however, the atheist could simply claim that both terms simply imply that the given conception is non-existent – an absolute negation. However, this semantic twist betrays two important facts: the first is that there are no such things as absolute negations. The second is that, while it may be the case that there is a confusion of language, there is an actual positive doxastic attitude towards the concept of God; so regardless if the concept seems incoherent, there seems to be something believed.
The first point is easy to understand. When A has none of the properties of B, it is only being said that A and B do not share the same properties, not that one doesn’t exist. When it is said that God does not share the same properties as the natural world, it is merely being claimed that God has attributes unlike the natural world. The only way that an atheist can suggest that this means “non-existent” is by assuming without justification that the natural world is all that exists. Even if one were to define the natural world as all that exists and claim that God doesn’t share the same properties, they are still not saying that God “is not,” because by positing something that has properties other-than, they are still positing something that is. In other words, by even conceptualizing something like ‘God’, one demonstrates that their concept of existence is limited in providing all meaning. If something truly is non-existent then it is impossible to conceive or able to be given a positive doxastic attitude. It is not that something actually is, but that it exists in some form (theoretically or otherwise) as to have meaning, which is all that is needed to show that the belief that “all meaning is derived from the natural world” is false.
The second fact follows from the first in that many people have a strong positive doxastic attitude towards the concept of God. It is obviously something that is understood. God, for most people, is a “literally Eternal, All-Knowing, All-Powerful, Absolute Existence distinct and transcendent from the natural world”. These are just to name a few attributes. When God is said to have “properties other-than the natural world” what is meant is that the natural world does not hold these limitless qualities. Of course, when said qualities become limitless, they cease to be things like ‘knowledge’ and ‘power’, because they transcend the usual constraints of what define these attributes. In other words, God’s attributes are only similar in part with attributes we believe ourselves to have, but His extend beyond the limitations of humanity– they are ultimately distinct from what can possibly be thought."